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Patterns of tool use in contemporary policy designs are much more varied than simply involving a cross-sectoral, government-wide shift towards policy mixes associated with enhanced market and network governance.

In the case of organizational tools there has been noticeable movement in many sectors away from the use of direct government instruments and public enterprises and towards the use of more indirect means of goods and service delivery such as partnerships, special operating agencies and quangos. However, this movement should not lead us to underestimate the resilience and continued presence of traditional direct government tools, especially line departments, which remain the backbone of most policy sectors. In the case of organization-based procedural tools, there has been a simultaneous movement towards the use of government organizational resources to involve larger components of the public or affected ‘stakeholders’ in policy deliberations. These moves, again while certainly not new, do reflect a shift in some policy sectors from state-led towards more societally driven modes of organization as efforts have been made in many countries to implement some aspects of network governance.

With respect to authoritative substantive instruments, this same pattern appears once again as traditional direct and indirect regulatory mechanisms which are a feature of implementation in legal and corporatist modes of from environmental protection to food safety. This deregulatory movement has been offset in many jurisdictions and sectors, however, by the return to direct or indirect regulation through re-regulation of areas such as telecommunications and energy in many countries (Majone 1997). The relative stasis in this category of tool choice is also visible in its procedural components, as traditional mechanisms such as advisory committee creation continue to be used extensively, whether the context is regulation, deregulation or re-regulation.

In the [...]

There have been some interesting developments in the patterns of use found in this very old set of instruments and some interesting tool dynamics well worth additional study. While most economic theories push for visible taxes and incentives in order to promote virtues and discourage vice, the reality in most countries is a trend towards more and more hidden financial tools – especially tax-based ones which are difficult to trace and quantify.
Howard (1993; 1995; 1997; 2002), for example, has estimated that the US welfare system in the mid-1990s included $896 million in direct expenditures but also $437.9 million in tax expenditures (1995: 26).4 He estimated tax expenditures in the USA grew by an average 4.8 per cent over the period 1967–95 versus 5.9 per cent for direct expenditure on income security, health, and housing, but over the period 1980–90 grew at a faster rate than direct expenditures (3.9 versus 3.1 per cent annual growth) with a similar pattern over the period 1975–95 (the ‘Republican era’ in US politics) in what was ostensibly a deficit cutting/free trade era of market-based governance.
This expansion has been fuelled by shifts in implementation preferences owing a great deal to the assessment criteria of visibility, intrusiveness, automaticity and cost. The tax system is already in place, along with a collections and enforcement apparatus, so changes to create new incentives or disincentives are largely matters of administration. There is some risk involved in their use, though, as it is often difficult to control whether or not a recipient will actually do what a government wants them to with the transferred funds. Besides problems with black and grey markets, market distortions and international prohibitions associated with this tool, agents can [...]

Each mode of governance comprises an ideal-typical mix of possible tool preferences whose use and interactions are more or less coherent and compatible. Legal governance, for example, is correlated closely with a preference for the use of direct government, laws and direct regulation, the use of excise taxes and insurance and, often, censorship and privacy laws; corporatist governance is correlated with a preference for the use of state-owned enterprises, independent and other forms of delegated regulation, the use of subsidies and grants, interest group mobilization and information campaigns; market governance is correlated with a preference for contracting out, voluntary regulation and deregulation, tax incentives, and data collection; and network governance with the use of clientele agencies, consultation mechanisms, interest group creation and access to information.
Experts in government see the links between these policy components in terms of their inter-compatibility and inner coherence and use their positions in policy advisory networks to develop policy alternatives which combine these elements in more or less consistent ways, choosing particular tools based on factors such as political, social and economic feasibility government capacity and target group structure, and calibrating specific tool components taking into account factors such as automaticity, cost, intrusiveness, visibility and precision of targeting. These factors and calculations change over time as the context of policy-making changes and shifts in governance modes and policy regime logics do occur, as globalization and network theorists rightly noted, leading to changes in overall policy design preferences.
However, these changes occur at different times and with different impacts in each policy sector and it is a mistake to think that a general macro-level societal movement such as networkization will manifest itself equally in all areas of state activity. This [...]