Treasure resources, of course, like organizational and authoritative ones, can also be used to alter the nature of policy processes. Procedural financial tools are generally used to attempt to alter or control aspects of the interest articulation and aggregation systems in contemporary states by creating or encouraging the formation of associations and groups where this activity might not otherwise occur, or, more prosaically, by rewarding government friends and punishing enemies through various kinds of payment schemes or penalties.
Phillip Schmitter, in his comparative studies of European systems, argued that the interest articulation systems in different countries form a spectrum from ‘free market’, ‘competitive’ pluralism to ‘state-sponsored oligarchic corporatism’ (see Figure 7.1).
In Schmitter’s (1977; 1985) view pluralism is a system of interest articulation in which interest groups are ‘free-forming’, have voluntary membership, and are multiple and non-monopolistic/competitive. That is, more than one group can represent individual members. This closely approximates the situation with network and market governance regimes at the sectoral level. Corporatist regimes are the opposite – they require state licencing, have compulsory membership, and are monopolistic.1 Neo-pluralism is a modern version of pluralism which takes into account some state activity in this area (e.g. the USA, Canada, Great Britain) and can be considered the analogue of legal governance at the sectoral level.2
Olson’s (1965) view of the ‘collective action problems’ interest groups face in these different governance contexts is an important insight helpful to understanding the rationales for the government use of the procedural financial instrument in these situations. Olson argued that in any political system, some individuals have fewer incentives and more disincentives to form and join interest groups than others – for example, someone benefiting from some proposed government action [...]

There are many different types of procedural tools linked with the use of specific government organizational resources which can affect various aspects of policy subsystem behaviour in policy processes. Interest in these tools has grown as many governments, as discussed in Chapter 1, have moved in the direction of more overt network management in some sectors in recent years.
Staff or central (executive) agencies
This is an old form of government organization, one in which a small, coordinating government agency, rather than one which directly delivers services to the public, is created to centralize agency initiatives in some area. Such ‘staff or ‘central’ agencies are generally created as a means to control other administrative agencies and are often linked very closely to the political executive (Bernier, Brownsey and Howlett 2005). In Westminister-style parliamentary systems, for example, older examples include privy council offices and treasury board secretariats, while newer ones include presidential, premier and prime minister’s offices, ministries of state, communication units, intergovernmental secretariats, and various kinds of implementation units (Chenier 1985; Savoie 1999; Lindquist 2006).
Although small (even most prime minister’s offices until recently had less than 100 personnel, most of whom handled correspondence) these are central co-ordinating units which exercise a great deal of control over other bureaucratic agencies through their links to the executive and to the budgetary and policy processes in government. They have seen much growth in recent years as political executives have sought to re-establish control over far flung administrative apparatuses (Campbell and Szablowski 1979; Rhodes and Weller 2001; Bevir et al. 2003; Bernier et al. 2005). Unlike line departments, these staff or central agencies are less, or non-hierarchical, flatter organizations typically staffed by political appointees, although others also [...]

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