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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/A-Last-Mile-Problem-A-Case-Study-of-the-MCE.pdf">A Last Mile Problem: A ‘Live’ Case Study of Marina Coastal Expressway </a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">VIGNESH LOUIS NAIDU</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2014</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">On 29<sup>th</sup> December 2013, Singapore’s tenth expressway – the Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE) – was officially opened. On the first working day after its opening, the MCE was plagued by congestion, leading many commuters to take to social media platforms to voice their anger and frustration. Many commentators attributed the congestion to the lack of salient and effective communication efforts to inform motorists of the quite major changes in the road network. This case study examines the communications strategy adopted by the authorities prior to the opening of the MCE, and asks what could have been done better if policymakers had paid more attention to behavioural insights. The case also analyses the effectiveness of the recovery methods by the authorities following the congestion on the first few days and the subsequent public unhappiness.
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/20140814-Managing-the-Sin-in-Singapores-Casinos.pdf">Managing the Sin in Singapore’s Casinos </a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">TAN SHIN BIN</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2014</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">Since Singapore’s early years of independence, the controversial proposal to boost economic growth by allowing casinos here had been repeatedly mooted. The idea had in turn been repeatedly rejected by decision makers who maintained that the social fallout from casinos would outweigh any economic benefits. In 2004 however, things took a different turn, when Singapore’s Prime Minister displayed an new openness to having casinos on local shores and called for a study on this proposal. This decision sparked off an unusually energetic public response, and generated much media coverage locally and internationally. The first half of this case examines the debate for and against the legalisation of casino gambling in Singapore, while the second half explores the decision taken, the impacts of the decision, and concludes with two simple questions for discussion: “Was the right decision taken?” and “What more should be done to curb the social costs of casino gambling?” Read more
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPP-Case-The-Aung-Sans-of-Myanmar.pdf">The Aung Sans of Myanmar</a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">CODY STEVEN ECKERT</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2013</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">This case provides an outline of the lives of General Aung San and his daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, of Myanmar. It highlights the challenges they faced as leaders, the tactics they used to confront these challenges and the resulting impacts. This case is intended to aid students in their understanding of contrasting leadership styles and their effects.
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPPCaseStudy11-02_Crisis_at_the_Delhi_Jal_Board.pdf">Crisis at the Delhi Jal Board</a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">P PRAVEEN SIDDHARTH and SHRIYA MOHAN</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2010</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">This case study highlights some of the issues in restructuring public institutions in developing countries with active civil society organisations. New Delhi, the large and fast growing capital city of India, has had a water problem for years which is a result of not just water shortage but also inefficient water management. In 1998, the local Delhi authorities embarked on a project to reform the local water supply authority, the Delhi Jal Board and approached the World Bank for assistance. The World Bank granted an initial loan of $2.5 Million for hiring consultants to study the issues and submit recommendations. Based on the advice of the selected consultants, the Delhi authorities planned to introduce reforms in two of the 21 existing water districts as a pilot scheme with additional funding from the World Bank to part-finance the project. However, this ran into rough weather with environmentalists as well as anti-corruption citizen groups protesting against the ‘privatization’ of water amid allegations of irregularities in awarding the project to the selected consultants by the World Bank.
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<h2>The Summer of Discontent: How the ‘India Against Corruption’ Movement Unfolded</h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">NIHIT GOYAL</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2013</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">This case study is in three parts and describes the leadership styles and challenges facing the ‘India Against Corruption’ (IAC) movement led by Anna Hazare and Arvind Kejriwal in India.
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<li><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPP-Case-The-Summer-of-Discontent-A.pdf">Case A describes the beginning of the IAC movement as a series of alleged corruption scandals came to light in 2010.</a> The IAC sought to pressurize the government into enacting a strong Lokpal (Public Ombudsman) Bill. The hunger strike staged by Anna Hazare drew massive public support and forced the government to create a joint drafting committee for the Lokpal Bill with five representatives from the government and five from IAC. The deliberations of the committee proved to be tough as the government reportedly accepted less than a dozen items from IAC’s 71-point agenda. The committee failed to reach consensus and IAC threatened to begin another hunger strike if a ‘strong’ Lokpal Bill was not introduced in Parliament.</li>
<li><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPP-Case-The-Summer-of-Discontent-B.pdf">Case B narrates how the government’s strategy of dealing with the second protest of the IAC movement backfired</a>. Anna and Kejriwal were arrested before they began their fast. IAC took full advantage of the situation and used the news and social media to mobilize public opinion against the government. Anna began his fast-unto-death inside prison while the government, on the back foot now, attempted to bring things under control. After days of negotiation, Anna ended his fast when the parliament passed a non-binding resolution to incorporate his key demands into the Lokpal Bill. In his speech, Anna called on his supporters to continue the struggle for change.</li>
<li><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPP-Case-The-Summer-of-Discontent-C.pdf">Case C case follows IAC’s quest to incorporate the non-binding ‘sense of the house’ resolution into the final version of the Lokpal Bill.</a> Though the bill was cleared by the lower house of parliament, it failed to pass through the upper house of parliament – and thus could not be enacted.</li>
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPP-Case-study_Not-the-Singapore-We-Know.pdf">Not the Singapore We Know: The Little India Riot 2013</a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">SOHNI KAUR</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2014</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">At about 10pm on Sunday, 8 December 2013, Singaporeans watched in shock as the media reported on a violent riot occurring in a popular local ethnic neighbourhood known as “Little India.” It had been more than 40 years since there was a riot in Singapore – the very word conjuring images of violence between ethnic groups leading to deaths and injuries, destruction of property and civil unrest. The horrors of riots in the 1950s and 60s were a persistent warning that had shaped the worldviews and policies of subsequent generations of Singaporeans. And yet, that night, Singaporeans stared in astonishment at video clips and images showing police cars overturned, an ambulance burning, and hundreds of police and other defence personnel deployed in full riot gear being pelted with glass bottles and other objects by an unruly mob. This case examines the economic, social, and policy/governance contexts of the Little India riot. It also discusses the immediate reactions and actions of government and other stakeholders in society, and asks whether and how the authorities might have responded better in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Our-Singapore-Conversation.pdf">Our Singapore Conversation: Bridging the ‘Great Affective Divide’?</a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">YVONNE GUO and CHARLES PHUA CHAO RONG</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2014</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">In 2012 after having obtained its lowest-ever electoral results in Singapore’s history in both parliamentary and presidential elections, and facing an unprecedented outpouring of discontent towards policies such as spiralling property prices and rapid immigration, the Singapore Government was faced with a conundrum: how could it rebuild trust with Singaporeans? This case study examines the background, process and outcomes of Our Singapore Conversation (OSC), situating it in the context of a long history of engagement initiatives in Singapore, as well as recent changes to Singapore’s political climate. What, or where, would the OSC lead to? And how could the OSC committee best design a consultative process that would rebuild trust between government and citizens?
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPP-CS_Social-Enterprise-in-Bali.pdf">Promoting Development Through A Social Enterprise in Bali</a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">PATRYA PRATAMA</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2013</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">In the village of Ban, East Bali, Indonesia, almost all local families grew cashews as a primary source of income. These were typically sold unprocessed to middlemen to be shipped and processed abroad. In 2012, East Bali Cashews (EBC) was established at the start of the harvest season as a Social Enterprise (SE). As a business that aimed to generate both financial and social return, the EBC team was faced with a set of decisions around how to target and scale up their social impact. These included how to channel the increased income of the workers, balance opportunities for increased impact, and extend its reach further across the supply chain.
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/LKYSPP-Case-study_The-Delhi-Gang-Rape-Case.pdf">The Delhi Gang Rape – Addressing Women’s Safety and Public Outrage</a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">SHRIYA MOHAN</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2013</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">On 16 December, 2012, Nirbhaya, a 23-year-old paramedical student, was returning home with her male friend, when she was assaulted and raped aboard a bus by six men. The brutality of the incident in upper-class South Delhi shocked the nation and captured international attention. It also unveiled a seething anger and a pent up desire for revenge as it mobilised tremendous public support in campaigning for women’s safety. Students, civil society activists, and the opposition political party known as the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) staged heated protests, and police resorted to using water cannons and tear gas. In the following days, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called for a commission for policy suggestions to come up with a strong anti-rape law that would deter such crimes. While some factors contributing to it stem from regional socio-cultural mindsets, the societal and psychological causes find resonance worldwide. What are some of the reasons for low reporting and conviction rates in India despite high rates of rape? And what policies would act as strong deterrents for the perpetrators of sexual violence and guarantee better safety for women?
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<h2><a href="http://policy-design.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/How-Should-the-Singapore-Government-Regulate-Online-News-Sites.pdf">How Should the Singapore Government Regulate Online News Sites?</a></h2>
<dl class="item-info"><dt class="author">Author/s:</dt><dd class="author">MELANIE CHUA</dd><dt class="posted">Year:</dt><dd class="posted">2013</dd><dt class="summary">Abstract:</dt><dd class="summary">On 28 May 2013, the Media Development Authority of Singapore (MDA) dropped a bombshell on the online community. In a press release, it declared that within three days, websites reporting on Singapore news, and with significant reach, will have to be licensed. This case examines the need for regulation of online news content, against a backdrop of rising online participation in civic and political affairs. It highlights the dilemmas faced by policymakers seeking to understand and regulate the news industry in the context of media convergence and a more active and engaged citizenry. Beyond examining the need for such Internet regulations, the case also raises questions of how the government should formulate and implement these regulations.
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